Guest Post – Twostix – How many voters boycotted the Fed Election 2022 ?

The voter turnout numbers from the AEC site are astonishing.

Nearly 30% of Australian voters boycotted the election.

The lowest turnouts are in the inner city seats consecutively, look at the comparisons to 2019:

Electorate, Turnout %, Enrolled, Marked Off, Turnout % Relative to 2019
Melbourne 61.4 114447 70270 -28.22
Sydney 61.83 125421 77550 -24.47
Brisbane 62.46 125241 78223 -28.05
Perth 62.63 122719 76856 -26.9

The highest turnout in all of Australia was just 86% in Page.

Just look at these numbers, a blood bath!

Electorate, Turnout %, 2022 vs 2019
Wright 63.72 -28.29
Melbourne 61.4 -28.22
Brisbane 62.46 -28.05
Chisholm 67.45 -27.36
Perth 62.63 -26.9
Cowan 64.07 -26.62
Higgins 67.09 -26.59
Bruce 65.6 -26.41
Bonner 66.67 -26.09
Wills 65.16 -26
Maranoa 65.99 -25.94
Swan 63.01 -25.84
Moreton 65.16 -25.76
Dickson 70.13 -25.31
Petrie 66.16 -25.14
Ryan 67.97 -25.01
Hotham 67.68 -24.71
Oxley 66.55 -24.65
McEwen 67.55 -24.61
Sydney 61.83 -24.47
Tangney 69.05 -24.45
Maribyrnong 69.26 -24.24
Kooyong 71.66 -24.17
Dunkley 68.24 -24.12
Gorton 66.99 -24.02
Mayo 71 -23.97
Lilley 68.45 -23.7
Longman 68.58 -23.58
Moncrieff 64.64 -23.56
Rankin 67.11 -23.56
Scullin 68.81 -23.42
Hasluck 65.89 -23.35
Casey 72.19 -23.33
Isaacs 70.23 -23.27
Fadden 66.51 -23.12
O’Connor 68.79 -23.03
Pearce 65.42 -22.99
Corio 71.04 -22.84
Blair 70.16 -22.78
Cooper 69.67 -22.67
Curtin 69.36 -22.64
Parramatta 66.98 -22.63
Spence 67.97 -22.57
Kingston 70.63 -22.54
Corangamite 73.3 -22.49
Jagajaga 72.79 -22.47
Fremantle 68.84 -22.39
Durack 63.04 -22.31
Adelaide 69.28 -22.24
Fraser 68.09 -22.01
Hindmarsh 70.86 -21.99
Makin 71.14 -21.98
Aston 72.33 -21.96
Boothby 71.7 -21.91
Griffith 69.24 -21.81
Gellibrand 69.1 -21.79
Groom 71.28 -21.77
Forde 67.77 -21.72
Burt 65.55 -21.44
Reid 70.46 -21.25
Brand 67.45 -21.01
Clark 72.74 -20.9
La Trobe 68.66 -20.56
Goldstein 73.16 -20.56
Bass 73.55 -20.49
Macnamara 69.66 -20.28

and on, and on, and on, not a single electorate isn’t impacted.

Somebody had better say something about this because this is historic, and if no explanation is offered people are going to start theorising about the election.

I cross referenced the turnout numbers against the voting numbers. They’re identical and those turnout numbers are up to date, seats like Moreton are 100% counted are reporting only 65% turnout.

So don’t let anyone say they “just need to update the figures” or something dumb. No.

My theory: unvaccinated and covid state power aggrieved people boycotted the election.

I know two people that did. I held my nose and voted for Chaos but ultimately put LNP before Labor at the bottom – but it disgusted me to do any of it, I fully understand them, I couldn’t have cared less about the entire thing in the lead up.

The establishment problem, if they address this and confirm that people stayed home en-masse….uh-oh!
1. Mandate? lol!
2. The number becomes a rough proxy for how many unvaccinated people there are….a lot more than 5%.
2a. But the lies Feb 2021 – Feb 2022! A rotten state and system from top to bottom, it must fall, surely!
3. Why has nobody said anything about this historic event straight away? Very sneaky are our overlords as they weave their sneaky narrative of a New Leftwing Australia without mentioning that 4+ million people boycotted the whole thing (absolutely allowing the green win in Brisbane and at least a couple of teal wins) – there was no magical surge, there was a boycott, a loss of votes from the system creating the illusion of an increase in others.
5. They have created millions of militant activists who now reject the entire system.

Who is ‘culminating’ in Ukraine?

Armchair Warlord recently posted an interesting thread on Twitter on the current military situation in the Ukraine. I would direct you to the thread for his brief account, but, in summary, his speculation is that the Ukrainian strategy appears to be to allow RuAF (Russian Armed Forces) to attempt to establish several ‘cauldrons’ in the Donbass, pockets of trapped UAF (Ukraine Armed Forces), and once they have ‘culminated’ – that is exhausted their offensive capability – launch their own offensive operations in turn.

This strategy depends upon a number of factors. Firstly, on RuAF actually employing the greater portion of its operational reserve in the current fighting in the Donbass, and secondly, on the condition of the UAF being better than we might otherwise believe.

What do we currently now about (1) and (2)? Well, the indications are re (1) that RUS has held back a large operational reserve (at least 15 BTGs) whose location we are unaware of and can only guess.

Regarding (2), there are several indications that the morale and attrition of the UAF is waning and high, respectively. We have now the surrender of the remnants of the UAF in Mariupol. There are increasing reports of desertions, refusals to fight, and surrender by batches of troops along the Donbass front, on the grounds of poor leadership, lack of adequate supply, and constant bombardment and fighting. There is also evidence that Western munitions are not being held back to equip these new formations, rather they are being sent to the front as soon as they arrive, and being used, captured or destroyed.

What happens if the UAF strategy is correct? I wouldn’t expect to see any stunning collapse on either the southern or eastern fronts. While the RuAF will have exhausted any major offensive capacity they will still be capable of holding a coherent front. The problem, however, would be that there would be no decisive engagement that could end the war in Ukraine for Russia on favourable terms. On the other hand, if the RuAF are indeed holding back a large mobile reserve, they would simply do what the UAF is purportedly doing; namely, they would continue to make the small but important gains they are currently making, out of Popasna, west and south of Izyum, and along the Seversky Donets river between Liman and Pryvillyia, and simply wait for any UAF offensive to exhaust itself or simple attrition to sufficiently weaken parts of the current Donbass front and call their reserve into action at those points. If that were to occur, I think we would see the collapse of the entire Donbass front for the UAF.

Who knows what will eventuate. As always, events will bear out the truth of the matter either way, but if the last two days are indicative, for instance, the situation at Liman is rapidly deteriorating for UAF while the breakout from Popasna is progressing in four directions, we will in all likelihood see a collapse of the Donbass front in the next two weeks, if not the coming week, and certainly within four, and may even see breakthroughs north of Kherson that put Nikolaev in jeopardy as that front begins to move as well.