Tucker Carlson’s interview (full interview here with timestamps) with Darryl Cooper (aka Martyr Made) caused a stir following the latter’s claim that WW2 well may have been avoidable had different decisions been made by Churchill. In this post, I want to simply address a ‘revisionist’ claim – made by Patrick Buchanan (former political advisor to Nixon and Reagan, opinion writer and author) and others that was echoed by Cooper – that a wider war might have been averted had had Britain not provided Poland the war guarantee in April ’39. In outlining this I’m going to use Buchanan’s argument as he details it in Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War.
To my mind, the debate here is essentially a ‘practical’ rather than an ‘historical’ one. The question isn’t so much about whether this or that happened, or about the plausibility of this or that interpretation regarding a set of facts. Rather, the debate is about whether this or that course of action was more or less desirable or not, could succeed or not, given the set of circumstances. That the decisions made by Chamberlain and then Churchill where animated by practical interests, whether avoiding a repeat of WW1, maintaining the UK’s vital interests on the Continent, and the like (this in many ways explains the furor this generated which I will leave to a future post). To some extent, historical facts can illuminate these questions but they’re not determinative.
Back then to the main thesis. Buchanan argues, straightforwardly, that since the UK had no way of defending the Danzig Corridor, no way of intervening before Germany could invade and defeat Poland, that any war guarantee was not only moot but counterproductive. All that the war guarantee achieves is a state of war between Germany and Britain. Rather, he argues, the more prudent approach for the British was to tell the Germans that any move West into the Low Countries and/ or France would immediately initiate a state of war between them (this is something that Chamberlain could have put to Hitler in Munich). This would have sent a signal to the Poles that they had to deal with the Germans themselves re the Danzig Corridor, and other outstanding issues, and come up with deal acceptable to both. To the Germans, it would reaffirm that Britain held Western Europe to be in their vital national interests and that any move West would initiate a state of war between the two.
This same rationale would also apply with the invasion of Poland. However, the decision to honour or dishonour the war guarantee is complicated because Chamberlain had been humiliated by Munich. Nevertheless, the strategic interests of Britain remain the same as before. Protect the Low Countries and France, and use the USSR acts as a counterweight to Germany in East Europe. Having no capability of saving Poland, the Western Powers could have avoided war by not declaring against Germany and simply providing Poland with whatever assistance was feasible so long as hostilies between the two continued. However, both Britain and France at this stage would have each been required to dishonour their defensive alliances with Poland. What needs must. By the third week of the Polish invasion, the USSR enters the war from the East against Poland. At this stage, the liberation of Poland becomes an even more remote possibility and the substance of the defensive alliances more illusory as both Britain and France decline to declare war on the USSR.
Moving on, nothing changes once Poland has fallen. Italy still remains neutral. Britain and France, though having declared war, are still intact and have not actively engaged the Germans in battle and retain a strong hand. There are still strong reasons to avoid a wider war between the Western Powers and Germany from occurring and even reason to think that negotiations, though likely to be beneficial to both the Germans and the Italians (as broker but also because Italy was ill-prepared for war) would also be beneficial to the Western Powers.
However, with the Fall of France, the hand of the British becomes weaker, that of the Germans stronger. Britain, on its own, had no means of taking the war directly to Germany on the Continent on the ground. Though not inconsiderable, its hand was limited to pressing the Germans by the use of its air and naval power. The only means of defeating Germany at this stage is by bringing either the USA or USSR or both into the war against Germany. Thus, turning, what at first was a local conflict, then a regional conflict, into a world-wide conflict.
“Buchanan”?
Who is this Buchanan?
May I suggest the casual reader, even most Cats, won’t know who you’re referring to. Best to introduce him before quoting him…yes?
Intro done, but there’s no quote.
In my mind, the perception of the time was that for written and agreed alliances to mean something, they must be honoured. Dishonouring the agreement with Poland would potentially mean every other alliance at the time was weakened which would have left France, Britain and Russia more vulnerable to an aggressive enemy. It’s easy to say in hindsight that there was a better course of action but that ignores that those Alliances were the supposed deterrance to large scale military action. Think of them as the nuclear weapons of their time.
But they dishonoured their agreements with Poland when the Soviets invaded from the East. Also, as I argued above, why enter into agreements, i.e. Britain’s war guarantee, you had no way of fulfilling and when you compound this by travelling to Moscow in ’44 and cede to the USSR Poland anyway?
The Soviet land grab was seen as better than letting Hitler have it all. Perhaps with hindsight a bad choice, but by then all well laid plans were out the window. They also would have been paranoid about USSR and Hitler becoming a proper alliance, with good reason. They chose they what they saw as the lesser of two evils many times. In hindsight, none of those decisions were clear cut, but it’s a stretch to call them malicious in the context of the actions of the Nazis at the time and the Soviets both prior to WW2 and subsequently.
You don’t need to call the Brits malicious. The question here is simply whether there were better alternatives to the one taken.
Cooper claimed that Churchill was the real villain of WW2. You need to separate that from claims that better decision could have been made. It’s an absurd proposition that Churchill was the real villain, or even that he was in a position to avoid conflict.
Sure, but he said he was exaggerating for effect as well. And I do separate that in the first paragraph. As to the latter claim, I don’t think its absurd to suggest that Churchill was indirectly and then directly in a position to avoid or delay conflict. With the first counterfactual: don’t provide Poland with a war guarantee, etc. he indirectly have made such a proposal post-Munich very difficult. Even if you think war was inevitable, anyway, that year between Munich and the Polish Invasion provided Britain with time for further rearmament.
Are you suggesting it was Churchill that declared war on Germany in WW2? Or that Churchill negotiated the pact with Poland? Poland annexed part of Czechoslovakia when Hitler went into Sudatenland and it wasn’t until Hitler took the remainder of Czechoslovakia that Chamberlain provided the Poland war guarantee, a move Churchill panned as too late.
Churchill can be bagged for working with the Soviets but in reality France fell shortly after Churchill came to power. He was dealt a very poor hand and probably could easily have just folded.
Clearly not given the post. I mention Chamberlain and Churchill, in succession, and imply that again, in comment above using indirectly and then directly. But, again, on the substance, what did the war guarantee achieve? Nothing. And then when the Soviets invade from the East its ignored.
The thing is, Buchanan argues that the Brits had no vital interests in the East so even if the Germans and Poles made a deal re Danzig and they pulled what they did in Czechoslovakia, given the fact of what transpired post-Moscow visit, the only difference would have been no war in the West of Europe, Germany as the central European power, and no war in the East with the Soviets and the Eastern European Power. I doubt Hitler would have invaded East if the Western Powers were still intact. And the Italians might have potentially remained neutral and avoided the Pact of Steel in ’39.
No doubt, Chamberlain badly mismanaged the whole affair. He was hopeless on the global stage. I think separating Churchill from that debacle makes sense. However, I doubt Hitler would have left France alone for very long. The timing of the invasion of france in May/june had little to do with affairs in the east or alliances and everything to do with capacity of the german war machine and their understanding of the capacity of the french. The phony war period only existed to allow Hitler to gear up, but waiting too long risked a more formidable opponent.
No reason to attack France if they are neutral, if your aims are all or interests are all in the East. It’s just securing your rear because they are in a state of war with you. Moreover, the posture of the Brits and French was entirely defensive. They knew that they could not defeat the Germans by attacking them which again makes the war guarantee all the more pointless and counterproductive. They were entirely dependent on the USSR and USA to defeat Germany. In that circumstance, the counterfactual put forward above works better.
The Germans and in particular Hitler, held a grudge about reparations. A grudge or which they primarily blamed the French. The Prussians also still held plenty of animosity at having been beaten by Napoleon (and HItler’s war machine was largely the Prussian war machine), I’d find it hard to believe Hitler would have let France Switzerland the war away. He wanted to right historic ‘wrongs’ and he had plenty of scores he wanted to settle.
Americas vital interest was to stop the formation of a new “super trading” block on the continent.
It had partially eviscerated the British Empire during WW1, and WW2 saw that goal completed.
But there is no way they could have let a German superstate form.
(this strips away all the good/evil bit and is a very sweeping and broad generalisation)
So that was Churchill’s plan? End the Empire and pass the baton to the US? Thing is, what was the chance of a German superstate forming in early ’39 if Britain and France avoided the war guarantee and thereby forced the Poles to deal with the Germans re Danzig? Low in all probability as they would, as a consequence, not have formed a pact with the USSR.
Another peuedo intellectual trying to make a name for themselves. This inaction by Britain could have led to her cousins pushing all the Slav over the Urals.
would this have left France a lone.
For everyone’s sake Churchill did the right thing, there was no other course of action.
The author sounds like a modern hedonist/ leftie, let other counties fight a war and we will give then what they want soo long it’s not me.
we’ll also talk big..
I doubt it. The Germans couldn’t defeat the USSR with France occupied. No reason to think they could have done that with France intact, especially given that Britain and France could have just as easily supplied the Soviets with materials even if they remained neutral.
Why would the French have supplied the Soviets if they like the UK would’ve remained neutral?
Because you can trade when neutral, the only specific provision is the supply of war materiel.
Trading isn’t the same thing as supplying war materials.
Yes, and? That is what I said above. Still, even if they went beyond peace time trade and sent war materiel to the USSR as well, that doesn’t make them a belligerent. In other words, they had multiple avenues available to them.
And? Is that your way of agreeing trading and supplying war material aren’t that same thing?
Yes, what else did you think I meant by: Because you can trade when neutral, the only specific provision is the supply of war materiel.
The provision/limitation is a condition of maintaining neutrality.
And in the latter reply, I say that even if they chose to break with neutrality, they can still supply war materiel and remain a non-belligerent.
Okay great, you agree they’re not the same. Why would someone who broke every single agree he made not view arms supply to the Soviets as an act of war?
Not sure why you’re pressing this point but he didn’t regard the US’s assistance, incl. war materiel, to Britain between ’39 and ’41 as an act of war.
Hitler got stroppy when the USN started escorting convoys as far as Iceland, including the sinking of a US destroyer by a U-Boat on October 1941, with the deaths of 100 sailors.
Shipping was attacked from the beginning of the war. Also, a US commercial ship was attacked and sunk in early part of 1941 .
Sure, but that didn’t mean there was a state of war between Germany and the US.
If you are referring to the Rueben James incident, it was surely pushing the margins (as FDR was by authorising the use of USN escorts).
No mention of the Japan.
Why mention Japan here?
If the West stood up to Hitler when he invaded the Czechs, instead of opening the door in the middle of night, there’s a chance he could have been stopped at that point. The German’s weren’t really in any condition to fight a proper war – Hitler just bluffed his way through. Even when Hitler invaded Poland, Germany was stretched, and one serious strike by England and France could have brought Hitler’s “Special Military Operation” to a speedy conclusion (had they taken the previous few years to properly re-arm).
It’s madness to believe that weakness and constant capitulation is a recipe for enduring peace.